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and the Monty-Hall problem
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The Monty-Hall Problem (MHP) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of
Bayesianism in two ways. First, psychologists have used it to illustrate that people do
not revise their degrees of belief in line with experimenters’ application of Bayes’ rule.
Second, philosophers view MHP and its two-player extension (MHP2) as evidence that
probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. Both arguments neglect the Bayesian
standpoint, which requires thatMHP2 (studied here) be described in different terms than
usually applied and that the initial set of possibilities be stable (i.e., a focusing situation).
This article corrects these errors and reasserts the Bayesian standpoint; namely, that the
subjective probability of an event is always conditional on a belief reviser’s specific current
state of knowledge.
Keywords: Bayesian standpoint, Monty-Hall problem with two players, probability revision, collider principle,
single case probability
1. Introduction
In the Monty Hall Problem (MHP), you know that the car you want is behind one of three closed
doors and a goat behind the other two doors. You choose a door and Monty (the host who knows
where the car is) opens another door with a goat behind (as you know he can neither open your
door nor a door with the car behind). After the host’s action, would you rather stick to your original
choice or switch to the remaining door?
MHP is a much-studied experimental paradigm investigating the inability of (naive and expert)
people to revise their degrees of belief in a Bayesian manner (for a recent review see Tubau et al.,
2015). Specific reformulations of format (natural frequencies, nested sets, visual representation,
etc.) improving Bayesian performance have triggered some psychological debates on the underlying
cognitive processes at play (for a recent analysis see Brase and Hill, 2015). Baratgin (2009)
argues that these different formats facilitating Bayesian performance actually enhance the correct
representation of the situation of revision in a stable universe, called the situation of focusing
(Dubois and Prade, 1992, 1997) for which only Bayes’ rule applies. The standard formulation of
MHP prompts participants to form different representations of the situation of revision. However,
when participants perceive the situation of focusing (for instance in a disambiguated version of
MHP as in Baratgin and Politzer, 2010), they produce the Bayesian answer. Hence, participants
cannot be considered as incoherent but only prone to an error induced by experimenters’
presentation (Baratgin, 2009; Baratgin and Politzer, 2010).
MHP is also used as an argument against the notion of single-case probabilities. Moser and
Mulder (1994) argued that there existed two opposite rational solutions: “sticking” for a MHP
proposed as a one-shot problem and “switching” for aMHP cast in a frequentist context (i.e., when
imagining a sufficiently large number of games). Horgan (1995) opposed this view making explicit
the correct solution for the one shotMHP and showing that switching is the only correct solution to
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both formulations. Baumann (2005, 2008) produced a new
argument based on a generalization of MHP: the Monty
Hall Problem with two players (MHP2, see Table 1). In his
view, although the two players share the same initial state
of knowledge, they eventually form two different probability
distributions. This point of view is opposed by Levy (2007) and
by Sprenger (2010) who rightly argue that the two players do
not necessarily share the same state of knowledge throughout the
game in particular when their original choices differ. However,
these authors do not explain the rationale of Baumann’s mistake
and do not explicitly define the causal structure ofMHP2
1.
This paper will address these questions. First, the solution
to MHP2 proposed as a one shot and its causal structure will
be detailed. Then, explanations for the failure of researchers
investigatingMHP2 will be advanced and related to the “bias” that
conducts psychologists to wrongly conclude that participants’
responses to MHP are of a non-Bayesian nature, that is, the
neglect of the Bayesian standpoint (de Finetti, 1974).
2. Solving the Monty Hall Problem with Two
Players
Let’s consider the following variables that define the properties
of the possible doors (D1,D2,D3) inMHP2: The three variables C
(The host’s original choice of the door in which to place the car),
Y (Your original choice of door) and B (Player B’s original choice
of door). C, Y , and B can take any of the three values Di (with
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}), respectively noted from now on ci, yi, and bi. The
variable H (the host’s choice when opening a door) is composed
of the two complementary sub variables ‘G’ (the host’s revealing a
goat) and ‘C’ (the host’s revealing a car). The sub variables ‘G’ and
‘C’ can take the three values Di (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}), respectively
noted from now on ‘gi’ and ‘ci’
2.
Following Walliser and Zwirn (2011), your beliefs before
learning message ‘g3’ assuming your initial choice is D1 (Stage
2) can be represented as a hierarchical dynamic probabilistic
structure (see Figure 1). The layer 0 depicts the four possible
strategies of the host, i.e., showing a goat behind D2 or D3 (‘g2’
or ‘g3’) or showing a car when the two players have originally
chosen two different doors with goats behind (‘c2’ or ‘c3’). Layer 1
corresponds to the three possible original choices of player B (b1,
b2 or b3). Layer 2 represents the original car placement choice of
the host (c1, c2, or c3). Layer 3 is your original choice (y1). The
probability distributions of the variables at the different layers
are defined by the statement of MHP2 with implicit and explicit
hypotheses about the host’s action and the players’ preferences.
At Stage 4 you learn that the host will open a door with a goat
behind. You know that (i) this door is either door D2 or D3 and
(ii) the car is either behind your door D1 or player B’s originally
1The term “causal” is missing in Baumann (2005). We find Horgan’s terminology
of “causal structure” in Levy (2007) with the vague definition of: “the set
of conditions that ultimately explains why sticking and switching have the
probabilities that they do” (Levy, 2007, p. 146). Finally, Sprenger (2010, p. 337)
admits that “the place of causality in the ‘causal structure’ of a Monty Hall game
remains obscure.”
2We use here quotes for all sub-variables related to the host’s actions during the
game.
chosen door. Hence you focus on the subset where ‘g2’ or ‘g3’ is
true (the continuous lines in Figure 1). You are better off sticking
to your initial choice D1.
P(c1|y1‘G’) = 3/7 > 2/7 = P(c2|y1‘G’) = P(c3|y1‘G’) (1)
Second at Stage 5 the host opens door D3 and reveals a goat
behind. You focus on the subset where ‘g3’ is true (the bold
lines in Figure 1). This information combined with your original
choice of door provides information about the door behindwhich
Monty placed the car. You are better off switching to door D2.
P(c1|y1‘g3’) = 3/7 < 4/7 = P(c2|y1‘g3’) (2)
Finally at Stage 6 you learn what was player B’s original choice.
On the one hand, it can coincide with yours (b1). Both players
are then exactly in the same situation with the same common
knowledge. MHP2 amounts to MHP. Hence, you know that C is
twice as likely to have the value c2 as to have the value c1. The best
strategy is to switch from your original choice to the other closed
door D2.
P(c1|y1b1‘g3’) = 1/3 < 2/3 = P(c2|y1b1‘g3’) (3)
On the other hand you may learn that player B’s original choice
is different from yours (b2). In this case there is no best strategy
and you are indifferent to sticking or switching.
P(c1|y1b2‘g3’) = 1/2 = P(c2|y1b2‘g3’) (4)
3. The Collider Principle
Glymour (2001) was the first to identify the causal structure
in MHP as a situation where two independent variables that
mutually influence another variable are dependent conditional
on the value of the variable they both affect. In MHP2, the three
independent variables Y , B, and C symmetrically influencing
(colliding with) another variable H (common effect) actually
appear dependent conditionally on the values of the variable H.
Hence observing the value of H provides some information on
the possible values of Y , B or C. In the same way, knowing the
values of any couple of variables (C, H), (B, H), and (Y , H)
provides some information about the values of couples (Y , B), (Y ,
C), and (B, C), respectively. Finally observing the values of triples
(Y , C,H), (B, C,H), (Y , B,H), respectively determines the values
of variables B, Y , and C. SolvingMHP2 as a one shot game relies
on the latter triple (Y , B,H). It is easy when two variables are fixed
to derive some qualitative predictions (Wellman and Henrion,
1993). For instance, MHP2’s solution supports a phenomenon
of reversal decision resulting from this collider principle. On
learning H = ‘g3’ given your original choice (Y = y1) the
likelihoods that B and C equal b2 and c2, respectively, are higher
than the likelihoods that B and C equal b1 and c1, respectively.
However, if in addition you learn that B equals b1 then the
outcome c2 seems the more likely. However, if you learn that B
equals b2 then the probabilities for the car being behind eitherD1
or D2 are even.
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TABLE 1 | The six sequential stages of MHP2.
Stages Descriptions
Stage 1 The TV host shows to two players (players A and B) three identical doors (let them be D1, D2, and D3) all equally likely, one hiding a car and the other two
hiding goats. It is assumed that the host has no preference for a specific door when he initially places the car behind it and that both players prefer to win the
car than a goat.a It is also assumed that the two players have a common initial state of knowledge and that no player has any preference for a particular door.
The players fully grasp the six stages of MHP2 and accept the implicit and explicit rules implied by its statement.
Stage 2 Each player picks a door and neither player is informed of the other player’s choice. Let’s assume for the sake of convenience that you are player A and you
initially select door D1.
Stage 3 The host, who knows where the car is, tells you: “In the case where player B has chosen the same door as you (here D1), I will show you one door (out of the
two other doors) behind which there is a goat.” It is assumed that both players know that the host has no preference between the two remaining doors (D2
and D3) to show a goat should the car be behind D1. Then the host continues: “In the case where player B has picked another door, I will always open the
third door -chosen by neither player- even if the car is behind it.” In this latter case when the host reveals a car, both players (you and player B) win and have
no decision to make; the game stops.
Stage 4 The host says “I will open a door to reveal a goat” and then asks both players still ignorant of the other player’s original choice: “To win the car should you
stick to your original choice or switch to another door (as far as you are concerned door D2 or door D3).”
Stage 5 The host opens a door (for example D3), reveals a goat and then asks both players again: “To win the car, should you stick to your original choice or switch to
the other closed door (door D2 in your case)?”
Stage 6 Each player reveals her or his original choice and must then decide knowing the other player’s choice whether to stick to her/his door (D1 in your case) or to
switch door (D2 in your case)
b.
a In the case where both players succeed in their door choice with the car, they each get a car. Hence, as noted by Sprenger (2010), there is no real competition between both players.
bThis version of MHP2 is derived from Baumann’s version (Baumann, 2005). The transitional Stage 4 is not presented by Baumann but it interestingly draws a comparison with MHP
where this information is not informative. We also added the Stage 6 to find again MHP in the situation where the two players have originally chosen the same door.
FIGURE 1 | The general tri-probabilistic structure of MHP2 before
learning message ‘g3’ assuming your initial choice is D1 (Y = y1). The
continuous lines correspond to the subset left after compiling information at
Stage 4 and the bold lines to the subset left after compiling the information at
Stage 5. Conversely the dashed lines represent the initial structure dropped
out at Stage 4.
Recent studies have provided some evidence that “naive”
adults and also children make correct qualitative predictions in
collider principle situations when pairs of causal conditionals
are explicitly presented (Ali et al., 2010, 2011). Precisely in
MHP, participants perform better when the relation between
the player’s original choice and the host’s strategy is explicit in
conditional form (Macchi and Girotto, 1994, cited in Johnson-
Laird et al., 1999). In the same way, when participants can
construct a representation analogous to Figure 1 for MHP
using a graph or by means of physical handling, participants’
performance improves significantly (Yamagishi, 2003; Baratgin
and Politzer, 2010). Thus, it seems that when participants can
infer the causal structure ofMHP by physical or explanatory cues,
they are able to solve MHP (Burns and Wieth, 2004; Chater and
Oaksford, 2006).
4. The Neglect of the Bayesian Standpoint
De Finetti’s subjective Bayesian standpoint proposes that
individuals form two levels of knowledge (de Finetti, 1980;
Baratgin and Politzer, in press):
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• An elementary level of knowledge of an event E that is always
conditioned on an individual’s specific state of knowledge {H0}
at this time. Furthermore, any event is actually a tri-event
(the third value representing ignorance between true event and
false event).
• A meta-level of knowledge concerning the degrees of belief
of an individual. Here ignorance is specified, and refined,
into degrees of belief. From an inferential point of view,
your subjective probability of this event E at time t0 is
always conditional on your current state of knowledge {H0}
[and should be written P(E|H0)]. It is coherent if (i) it
follows the axiom of additive probabilities3 and (ii) when
acquiring a new knowledge H, your probability also depends
on this new knowledge {H0H} [and should be written
P(E|H0H)].
A person dismissing the Bayesian standpoint considers the
probability of a single event as questionable as compared to a
“frequentist” conception of probability. She takes the frequentist
conception to be the “correct” comparative representation,
and confines Bayesianism to just a set of Bayesian techniques
(de Finetti, 1974). In the psychological literature this “bias”
leads to two significant mistakes: (i) to the neglect of pragmatic
constraints on the methodology (to understand H0 and H); (ii)
to the conclusion that people’s behavior is “non-Bayesian,” even
when the behavior does not violate Bayesian coherence (Baratgin,
2002; Mandel, 2014a). In the analysis of MHP2, this bias is
characterized by inadequate terminology and interpretation of
the revision situation.
4.1. The Use of an “Ambiguous Terminology”
For a subjective Bayesian, an event E always refers to a certain
outcome in a single well-defined case (a unit in which the
definition is unambiguous and complete) and cannot be used
in a generic sense (such as a collection of “identical events”).
There is no repetition of the same event but a succession of
many distinct events, which can be different illustrations of the
same phenomenon. In Moser and Mulder (1994), Baumann
(2005), Levy (2007), and Baumann (2008), MHP2 is presented
in an ambiguously termed way (de Finetti, 1977/1981, p. 357).
The variables are considered as trials of the same phenomenon
without completely specifying them and their possible values.
Every specific door corresponds to a generic door D that is
characterized by two properties: having a car (C) or a goat (G)
behind it. Every player’s original door choice is analyzed by its
correspondence with C and G. The host’s door opening ‘H’ is
characterized by the two sub-classes ‘G’ and ‘C’. The players’
final decisions to win the car are commingled and considered
to pertain to the same classes of events “to stick,” “to switch” or
“nothing.”
Following this frequentist “jargon” (de Finetti, 1979a,b),MHP2
is analyzed as an observation of a repetitive problem where
the different variables are interchangeable in function of the
host’s car placement. Instead of considering each player with
specific states of knowledge relative to each stage of MHP2
3See for example on this special research topic (Cruz et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015;
Mandel, 2015) and also (Politzer and Baratgin, in press).
both players are assumed to have a common knowledge at each
stage of the game. Their probabilities that there is a car behind
one of the two remaining doors (after the door with a goat
behind was opened) is 3/7 for the door originally chosen and
4/7 for the other door. Thus, imagining they made a different
original choice, each door can be associated with two different
probabilities (3/7 and 4/7) illustrating Bauman’s paradox. Now,
if we consider the specific knowledge of each player, the paradox
disappears. In Stages 4 and 5, player B’s probabilities on c1 and c2
are identical to your probabilities (relations 1–3) when his/her
specific initial state knowledge is identical to yours (his/her
original choice is b1). Conversely when his/her original choice is
b2, his/her state of knowledge is different from yours and his/her
probabilities correspond to different probabilities (relations
5 and 6):
P(c1|b2‘G’) = P(c3|b2‘G’) = 2/7 < 3/7 = P(c2|b2‘G’) (5)
P(c1|b2‘g3’) = 4/7 > 3/7 = P(c2|b2‘g3’) (6)
However, player B’s decisions are identical: sticking at
Stage 4 and switching at Stage 5. At Stage 6, both players
have an identical state of knowledge and probabilities
(relation 4).
4.2. Neglect of the Situation of Focusing
MHP2 illustrates that the situation of revision implied by the
Bayesian standpoint is a process of focusing on a subset of the
initial state of knowledge {H0} (de Finetti, 1957; Dubois and
Prade, 1992, 1997). It is assumed that one object is selected
from the universe and that a message releases information
about it. A reference class different from the initial one is
consequently considered by focusing attention on a given subset
of the original set that complies with the information about the
selected object. This is not a temporal revision process because
the information ‘g3’ just focuses on the selection of a particular
posterior probability that was virtually available (among others)
(see the bold lines of Figure 1). Yet participants in MHP seem
to adopt (for pragmatic reasons) another representation of the
revision situation, known as updating (Katsuno and Mendelzon,
1992; Walliser and Zwirn, 2002) in which, they infer from the
message ‘g3’ the information as “door D3 have been removed,”
and conceive a new probability distribution consistent with this
new problem (Baratgin and Politzer, 2007, 2010; Baratgin, 2009).
In this representation there is obviously no collider effect because,
in this new problem with two doors, the variables Y and H always
remain independent after the information is provided by the
host. Participants form a new distribution of probability P′ for
this new game4. Two typical analyses are consistent with this
interpretation:
The stick or switch response: if you originally chose door D1
and the host opens door D3 with a goat behind, the worlds c1
and c2 are evenly close (in fact proportionally to their prior
probabilities) to the invalidated world c3. The weight of c3
4P′ along the following process: (i) The worlds ‘c3’ and ‘g2’ are canceled and a
simpler probabilistic structure composed of the two worlds (c1, c2) is obtained,
(ii) The new distribution P′ stems from a redistribution of the weights (the
probabilities) of the removed worlds on the two remaining worlds.
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is redistributed proportionally on c1 and c2. This is MHP’s
solution in the updating context proposed by Dubois and Prade
(1992).
P′(c1|y1) = P(c1|y1)+ 1/2P(c3|y1) = 1/2
= P(c2|y1)+ 1/2P(c3|y1) = P
′(c2|y1) (7)
It corresponds to the “equiprobability” solution given
by nearly all participants to MHP but also by some
experts in their analysis of MHP in a single isolated
situation (Moser and Mulder, 1994) and of MHP2 (Levy,
2007).
The switch response: The worlds c3 and c2 (the two doors
not originally chosen by the player) are considered closer. The
probability of the invalidated world c3 is transferred to c2 alone.
This isMHP’s solution in the updating context proposed by Cross
(2000).
P′(c1|y1) = P(c1|y1) = 1/3 and
P′(c2|y1) = P(c2|y1)+ P(c3|y1) = 2/3 (8)
This response is given by only few participants to MHP (see for
review Baratgin, 2009). It corresponds to Moser and Mulder’s
explanation for MHP’s solution in a suitable long run of
relevantly similar situations. To explain the “causal structure”
of MHP, Levy (2007) proposed also a process in line with
this updating interpretation. However, it is difficult here to
support the “switch” response to MHP2 with the symmetric
role of the two players (Levy, 2007). Thus, the “stick or switch
response” should be privileged to solve MHP2 in an updating
representation.
5. Conclusion
This paper describes the supposedly paradoxical solutions
attributed toMHP2 from the perspective of a thorough Bayesian
standpoint perspective. It outlines the methodological care that
one should take to comprehend the problem in relation to the
single case terminology and the focusing context of revision.
Not taking into account these features prevents one from fully
grasping the probabilistic temporal dynamics of the problem and
consequently the corresponding causal collider structure.
Psychologists who study subjective Bayesian reasoning should
carefully formulate the statement without ambiguity and respect
the Bayesian standpoint. This is also true especially for complex
problems (such as the Sleeping Beauty problem Baratgin and
Walliser, 2010; Mandel, 2014b) in which different solutions
can be envisaged depending on the interpretations made by
participants.
Acknowledgments
Financial support for this work was provided by a grant from the
ANR Chorus 2011 (project BTAFDOC). The author thanks N.
Cruz, G. Politzer, and B. Walliser for very helpful comments on a
previous draft of this manuscript.
References
Ali, N., Chater, N., and Oaksford, M. (2011). The mental representation of
causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models. Cognition 119,
403–418. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.02.005
Ali, N., Schlottmann, A., Shaw, A., Chater, N., and Oaksford, M. (2010).
“Causal discounting and conditional reasoning in children,” in Cognition
and Conditionals. Probability and Logic in Human Thinking, eds M.
Oaksford and N. Chater (New York, NY: Oxford University Press),
117–134.
Baratgin, J. (2002). Is the human mind definitely not bayesian? A review of the
various arguments. Curr. Psychol. Cogn. 21, 653–682.
Baratgin, J. (2009). Updating our beliefs about inconsistency: the Monty-Hall case.
Math. Soc. Sci. 57, 67–95. doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.08.006
Baratgin, J., and Politzer, G. (2007). The psychology of dynamic probability
judgment: order effect, normative theories and experimental methodology.
Mind Soc. 6, 53–66. doi: 10.1007/s11299-006-0025-z
Baratgin, J., and Politzer, G. (2010). Updating: a psychologically basic
situation of probability revision. Think. Reason. 16, 253–287. doi:
10.1080/13546783.2010.519564
Baratgin, J., and Politzer, G. (in press). “Logic, probability and inference: a
methodology for a new paradigm,” in Cognitive Unconscious and Human
Rationality, eds L. Macchi, M. Bagassi, and R. Viale (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press).
Baratgin, J., andWalliser, B. (2010). Sleeping beauty and the absent-minded driver.
Theory Decis. 69, 489–496. doi: 10.1007/s11238-010-9215-6
Baumann, P. (2005). Three doors, two players, and single-case probabilities. Am.
Philos. Q. 42, 71–79. Available online at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010183?
seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Baumann, P. (2008). Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s
view. Synthese 162, 265–273. doi: 10.1007/s11229-007-9185-6
Brase, G. L., and Hill, W. T. (2015). Good fences make for good neighbors but bad
science: a review of what improves bayesian reasoning and why. Front. Psychol.
6:340. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00340
Burns, B., and Wieth, M. (2004). The collider principle in causal reasoning:
why the Monty Hall dilemma is so hard. J. Exp. Psychol. 133, 434–449. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.133.3.434
Chater, N., and Oaksford, M. (2006). “Information sampling and adaptive
cognition,” in Mental Mechanisms. Speculations on Human Causal Learning
and Reasoning, eds K. Fiedler and P. Juslin (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 210–236.
Cross, C. B. (2000). A characterization of imaging in terms of Popper functions.
Philos. Sci. 67, 316–338. doi: 10.1086/392778
Cruz, N., Baratgin, J., Oaksford, M., and Over, D. E. (2015). Bayesian reasoning
with ifs and ands and ors. Front. Psychol. 6:192. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00192
de Finetti, B. (1957). L’informazione, il ragionamento, l’inconscio nei rapporti con
la previsione. L’industria 2, 3–27.
de Finetti, B. (1974). Bayesianism: its unifying role for both the foundations and
applications of statistics. Int. Stat. Rev. 42, 117–130.
de Finetti, B. (1977/1981). La probabilità: guardarsi dalle contraffazioni. Scientia
111, 255–281.
de Finetti, B. (1979a). Jargon-derived and underlying ambiguity in the field of
probability. Scientia 114, 713–716.
de Finetti, B. (1979b). Probability and exchangeability from a subjective point of
view. Int. Stat. Rev. 47, 129–135.
de Finetti, B. (1980). “Voice probabilitá,” in Encyclopedia, (Torino: Einaudi),
1146–1187.
Dubois, D., and Prade, H. (1992). Evidence, knowledge, and belief functions. Int.
J. Approx. Reason. 6, 295–319. doi: 10.1016/0888-613X(92)90027-W
Dubois, D., and Prade, H. (1997). “Focusing vs. belief revision: a fundamental
distinction when dealing with generic knowledge,” in Qualitative and
Quantitative Practical Reasoning, Vol. 1244 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1168
Baratgin Rationality, the Bayesian standpoint, and the Monty-Hall problem
Science, eds D. Gabbay, R. Kruse, A. Nonnengart, and H. Ohlbach (Berlin;
Heidelberg: Springer), 96–107.
Evans, J. S. Thompson, V. A., and Over, D. E. (2015). Uncertain deduction and
conditional reasoning. Front. Psychol. 6:398. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00398
Glymour, C. (2001). The Mind’s Arrows: Bayes Nets and Graphical Causal Models
in Psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Horgan, T. (1995). Let’s make a deal. Philos. Pap. 24, 209–222. doi:
10.1080/05568649509506532
Johnson-Laird P. N., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., and Sonino-Legrenzi, M. S. (1999).
Naive probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychol.
Rev. 106, 62–88. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62
Katsuno, A., and Mendelzon, A. (1992). “On the difference between updating
a knowledge base and revising it,” in Belief Revision, ed P. Gärdenfors
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 183–203.
Levy, K. (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case
probabilities. Synthese 158, 139–151. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9065-5
Macchi, L., and Girotto, V. (1994). “Probabilistic reasoning with conditional
probabilities: the three boxes paradox,” in Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Society for Judgement and Decision Making. (St. Louis, MO)
Mandel, D. R. (2014a). The psychology of bayesian reasoning. Front. Psychol.
5:1144. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01144
Mandel, D. R. (2014b). Visual representation of rational belief revision:
another look at the sleeping beauty problem. Front. Psychol. 5:1232. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01232
Mandel, D. R. (2015). Instruction in information structuring improves
bayesian judgment in intelligence analysts. Front. Psychol. 6:387. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00387
Moser, P. K., and Mulder, D. H. (1994). Probability in rational decision-making.
Philos. Pap. 23, 109–128. doi: 10.1080/05568649409506416
Politzer, G., and Baratgin, J. (in press). Deductive schemas with uncertain
premises using qualitative probability expressions. Think. Reason. doi:
10.1080/13546783.2015.1052561
Sprenger, J. (2010). Probability, rational single-case decisions and the Monty Hall
problem. Synthese 174, 331–340. doi: 10.1007/s11229-008-9455-y
Tubau, E., Aguilar-Lleyda, D., and Johnson, E. D. (2015). Reasoning and choice in
the monty hall dilemma (mhd): implications for improving bayesian reasoning.
Front. Psychol. 6:353. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00353
Walliser, B., and Zwirn, D. (2002). Can Bayes rule be justified by cognitive
rationality principles? Theory Decis. 53, 95–135. doi: 10.1023/A:10212271
06744
Walliser, B., and Zwirn, D. (2011). Change rules for hierarchical beliefs. Int. J.
Approx. Reason. 52, 166–183. doi: 10.1016/j.ijar.2009.11.005
Wellman, M., and Henrion, M. (1993). Explaining ‘explaining away’. IEEE Trans.
Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 15, 287–292.
Yamagishi, K. (2003). Facilitating normative judgments of conditional probability:
frequency or nested sets? Exp. Psychol. 50, 97–106. doi: 10.1026/1618-
3169.50.2.97
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Baratgin. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1168
